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Balancing the Adoptive Triangle: The Need to Protect Biological Parents’ 
Privacy Rights 
 
Adrienne Fleming 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Access to adoption records has been fiercely contested for decades, particularly because 
it involves the right to privacy, which is inherent in the concept of liberty.
1   
The Supreme Court 
has found that the right to privacy – or “the right to be let alone – [is] the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”2    The desire to be left alone is intricately 
intertwined with a biological parent’s decision to place her child for adoption.   On the other 
hand, adoptees assert that they have a “right” to know their heritage.  In order to reach a middle 
ground and balance the competing interests of the parties involved, many states have made 
significant advancements with regard   to openness in the adoption process by (1) allowing 
adoptees to access non-identifying information, (2) creating a voluntary access registry, and (3) 
judicially authorizing "open adoptions" when deemed in the child's best interest. 
Part II of this paper reviews the historical roots of adoption in the United States and the 
shift in adoption statutes from confidentiality to secrecy.  Part III discusses the substantial hurdle 
of demonstrating “good cause” that adoptees face in petitioning the courts to unseal adoption 
records.  Part IV addresses the fierce debate over adoptees’ access to identifying information.   It 
discusses the constitutional challenges brought by adult adoptees to the sealed records statutes, 
and the public policy arguments touted by proponents of open records.   Also, it analyzes the 
fundamental constitutional rights that would be violated by allowing adoptees access to the 
biological parents’ identifying information.   Finally, Part V proposes a strategy to serve and 
more efficiently protect the interests of all parties in the adoption process, specifically requiring 
biological  parents  to  disclosure  their  family’s  medical  history and  undergo  genetic  testing, 
 
 
 
1 
See generally Elizabeth J. Samuels, The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry into the History of Adult Adoptee 
Access to Birth Records, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 367 (2001). 
2 
Stanley v. Georgia , 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
3  
 
 
establishing a national voluntary mutual consent registry, and protecting open adoptions and 
agreements regarding post-termination contact between the biological parent and the adoptee. 
II.       Historical Context of Adoption 
 
During the Colonial Period and in the early years of the Republic, adoptions were rare.
3
 
 
Abandoned or orphaned children were placed with extended families if possible or “bounded 
out” to strangers as indentured servants or apprentices.4   These arrangements typically exploited 
the children and were far short of a nurturing, stable family environment.
5   
At the time, there was 
great demand for indentured orphans due to a labor shortage.
6    
Therefore, the orphans’ welfare 
was overlooked in favor of economic interests.
7
 
In the early nineteenth century, immigrants became the preferred source for cheap labor, 
and fewer families were willing to take in orphans.
8    
Moreover, the influx of poor immigrants 
caused a swell in the number of homeless children. 
9   
States initially tried to corral these children 
into  orphanage,  but  they  were  overly  crowded,  poorly  funded,  and  demoralizing  for  the 
children.
10    
After this unsuccessful initiative, pursuant to their parens patriae power, states 
legislatively created the adoption process to protect children’s welfare.11   In 1851, Massachusetts 
enacted this country’s first adoption statute.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
David R. Papke, Pondering Past Purposes: A Critical History of American Adoption Law, 102 W. VA. 
L. REV. 459, 461 (1999). 
4 
Id. 
5 
Id. 
6 
Id. 
7 
Id. 
8 
Id. at 467. 
9 
Id. 
10 
Id.at  468. 
11 
Id. 
12 
Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and 
the Court, 1796-1851, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 1038, 1041 (1979). 
4  
 
 
Today, the vast majority of states have laws that deny adopted children access to their 
original birth certificates; however, adoption laws did not begin this way.
13    
Initially, adoption 
statutes provided “neither for confidentiality with respect to the public nor for secrecy among the 
parties, but were subsequently amended to protect the parties from public scrutiny.”14     The 
earliest adoption laws provided no restrictions on who could access adoptees’ original birth 
certificates or adoption records because confidentiality was not a concern due to the informal 
nature of adoptions.
15   
In 1916, New York was the first to limit access to the adoption records to 
only the parties involved in the matter.
16    
Shortly thereafter, Minnesota enacted the first statute 
requiring the sealing of adoption records, which prohibited the general public as well as the 
parties involved from accessing the records.
17     
It was not until the 1930s that states began 
altering their approach to adoption records and required the issuance of new birth certificates 
with the adoptive parents’ names substituted for the birth parents’ names.18 
The final movement from adoptive “confidentiality to secrecy” has been attributed to the 
deepening stigmas on unwed mothers, infertile couples, and illegitimate children which emerged 
from the post-World War II baby-boom atmosphere.
19   
It was argued that changing the parents’ 
names on an adopted child’s birth certificate and placing the original certificate under seal 
protected the biological mothers from the stigma of being an unwed  mother, protected the 
adoptive parents from the stigma of infertility,  and protected the child from the stigma of 
 
 
13 
Rosemary Cabellero, Open Records Debate: Finding the Missing Piece, 30 S. ILL. U. L. J. 291, 291 
(2006). 
14 
Samuels, supra note 1, at 368. 
15 
Caroline B. Fleming, The Open-Records Debate: Balancing the Interests of Birth Parents and Adult 
Adoptees, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 461, 461-62 (2005); see also Joan H. Hollinger, Aftermath of 
Adoption Legal and Social Consequences, in ADOPTION LAW & PRACTICE 13:01, at 13-4 to 13-5 (Joan H. 
Hollinger ed. 1998). 
16 
See 1916 N.Y. Laws ch. 453, 113; see also Hollinger, supra note 15, at 13-5. 
17 
See 1917 Minn. Laws ch. 222, 337; see also Hollinger, supra note 15, at 13:5. 
18 
Samuels, supra note 1, at 375-76. 
19 
Fleming, supra note 15, at 462. 
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illegitimacy.
20   
By the 1970s, every state, with the exception of Alaska and Kansas, required the 
adoption records and original birth certificates to be placed under seal and denied access to such 
records except by court order upon a showing of “good cause.”21 
III.      The Ad op tee’s  Bu rd en  of  S h ow in g  “Good  
Cause”  
 
State statutes, which mandate the sealing of adoption records, allow the records to be 
released upon the adoptee’s showing of “good cause.”22    However, no adoption statute defines 
the term “good cause.”23    The New York Court of Appeals noted that good cause has “no 
universal, black-letter definition,” and that “whether it exists, and the extent of disclosure that is 
appropriate, must remain for the courts to decide on the facts of each case.”24    In determining 
whether  good  cause exists  to  lift  the cloak of  confidentiality,  and  the extent  of disclosure 
necessary, courts attempt to balance the competing interests of the adoptee, the birth parents, and 
the adoptive parents.
25   
These competing interests include the following: 
(1) the nature of the circumstances dictating the need of the identity of the birth parents; 
(2) the circumstances and desires of the adoptive parents; (3) the circumstances of the 
birth parents and their desire or at least the desire of the birth mother not to be identified; 
and (4) the interests of the state in maintaining a viable system of adoption by the 
assurance of confidentiality.
26
 
Unfortunately, judicial interpretation of the good cause standard varies significantly from 
state to state.
27   
Despite the variance, the good-cause requirement is a formidable hurdle
28   
which 
 
 
 
 
20 
Id. 
21 
Samuels, supra note 1, at 378-82. 
22 
DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW – DOCTRINE, POLICY, AND 
PRACTICE 743-44 (West Group 2000). 
23 
Audra Behne, Balancing the Adoption Triangle: The State, the Adoptive Parents and the Birth Parents 
– Where Does the Adoptee Fit In?, 15 BUFF. JOUR. PUB. INT. LAW 49, 71 (1996). 
24 
Matter of Linda F. M. , supra note 32, at 240. 
25 
See, e.g., In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1385 (R.I. 1986). 
26 
Application of George, 625 S.W.2d 151, 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 
27 
See Maureen A. Sweeney, Between Sorrow and Happy Endings: A New Paradigm of Adoption, 2 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 329, 343-44 (1990). 
28
Abrams & Ramsey, supra note 22, at 744. 
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requires  a  party to  demonstrate  "a  compelling  need  for  the  identifying  information.”29      In 
general, to overcome this hurdle, the adoptee must demonstrate an urgent need for medical, 
genetic, or other reasons.
30   
Although each jurisdiction determines what constitutes good cause, 
certain commonalities exist in the case law.  Courts have held that “mere curiosity” or a “desire 
to know one’s ancestry” do not constitute good cause.31 
In Matter of Linda F.M. v. Dept. of Health,
32 
a 40-year-old adoptee unsuccessfully sought 
 
the release of her adoption records.  The adoptee alleged that her inability to discover the identity 
of her biological parents had caused her psychological problems that led to the dissolution of her 
marriage and hampered her artistic and musical creativity.
33   
She asserted that she “[felt] cut off 
from the rest of humanity” and needed to know “who I am.”34   The court acknowledged that the 
“desire to learn about one’s ancestry should not be belittled,” but held that a “mere desire to learn 
the identity of one’s natural parents cannot alone constitute good cause, or the requirement… 
would be a nullity.”35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
In re Adoption of S.J.D., 641 N.W.2d 794, 799-800 (Iowa 2002); see also In re Estate of McQuesten, 
578 A.2d 335, 339 (N.H. 1990) (“an adoptee bears a heavy burden”); In re Long, 745 A.2d 673, 675 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2000) (good cause must be established by "clear and convincing evidence”); Bradey v. 
Children's Bureau of S.C., 274 S.E.2d 418, 422 (S.C. 1981) ("disclosure follows in extraordinary 
circumstances”). 
30 
Abrams & Ramsey, supra note 22, at 744. 
31 
See In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 766 (Mo. 1978) (holding a thinly supported claim of "psychological 
need to know" will not support a finding of good cause); but see In the Matter of Robert Wilson, 153 
A.D.2d 748, 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (psychological trauma is sufficient to establish “good cause” if 
the trauma is directly connected to the lack of knowledge of ancestry); In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 
1386 (R.I. 1986) (severe psychological need to know one's origins may present compelling circumstances 
that constitute good cause); Bradey v. Children’s Bureau of South Carolina, 274 S.E.2d 418, 422 (S.C. 
1981) (implying that adoptee might have shown good cause if he had required medical assistance for his 
feelings of insecurity or demonstrated that he was unable to maintain steady employment or a stable 
family life due to an identity crisis). 
32 
418 N.E.2d 1302, 1304 (N.Y. 1981). 
33 
Id. 
34 
Id. 
35 
Id. 
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In the context of medical necessity, courts have held that good cause is not established 
when adoptees assert that having access to the biological family’s medical history would be 
“very helpful” in assisting the treating physicians in “better diagnosing” and “more effectively” 
caring for the adoptee, who does not have a serious medical condition.
36   
Moreover, courts have 
noted  that  granting  access  to  the  biological  parents'  medical  records  any  time  an  adoptee 
presented with a condition that had some genetic component or potential hereditary implication 
would undermine the confidentiality afforded by adoptions statutes.
37
 
In Golan v. Louise Wise Servs.,
38 
a 54-year-old adoptee, who was suffering from a heart 
 
condition, unsuccessfully sought the release of his adoption records.   The adoptee and his 
attending physicians argued that the genetic information of his biological parents would assist in 
his treatment and help enable the physicians to evaluate the severity of his condition.
39    
The 
adoptee alleged that his career was in jeopardy because the Federal Aviation Administration 
would not recertify his pilot’s license without this information.40   The court sought to weight “the 
medical  danger  in  which  adopted  children  may  be  placed  in  the  absence  of  their  genetic 
histories” against the fact that “as virtually any adopted person advances in age, his or her 
genetic history will be desirable for treatment of a variety of ailments.”41   In denying his request, 
the court noted that a “rule which automatically gave full disclosure to any adopted person 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
Matter of Timothy A.A.., 72 A.D.3d 1390, 1391 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); see also In re George, 625 
S.W.2d 151, 153 (Mo. App. 1981) (holding that a fatal leukemia condition that could potentially be 
treated with a bone marrow transplant from a close blood relative was not sufficient good cause to open 
an adult adoptee's records). 
37 
Id. 
38 
507 N.E.2d 275, 276 (N.Y. 1987). 
39 
Id. 
40 
Id. 
41 
Id. at 279. 
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confronted with a medical problem with some genetic implications would swallow New York’s 
 
strong policy against disclosure as soon as adopted people reached middle age.”42 
 
In Sandra L.G. v. Bouchey,
43  
an adult adoptee sought access to her adoptive records to 
determine  whether  she  was  genetically  predisposed  to  a  medical  problem  with  respect  to 
potential marriage and child bearing.  The court found that the New York legislature had taken 
adequate steps to give adopted children the benefit of the advances in scientific knowledge while 
maintaining the confidence of the biological parents.
44     
The adoption statute gave adoptees 
access to various information about their biological parents, including heritage, ethnic 
background, general physical attributes, and health history.
45    
The court found that good cause 
did not exist as the information mandated by the statute was adequate to satisfy the adoptee’s 
general medical concerns.
46
 
IV. Debate Over Access to Identifying Information in Adoption Records 
 
The debate over access to identifying information in adoption records has raged for 
decades.
47      
This  debate  can  be  assessed  on  two  levels:    on  the  one,  both  proponents  and 
opponents have sought to assert constitutional rights that merit special legal deference to their 
positions; on the other, each side has argued that for the sealing or unsealing adoption records 
based on public policy considerations.
48
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
Id. 
43 
576 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991). 
44 
Id. at 768. 
45 
Id. at 769. 
46 
Id. 
47 
See generally Samuels, supra note 1. 
48 
Brent J. Clayton, How Much Do You Need to Know About Yourself? Why Utah Should Start Letting 
More Adult Adoptees Decide, 10 J. L. FAM. STUD. 421, 424 (2008). 
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A. Arguments in Favor of Open Records Statutes 
 
1. Constitutional Arguments 
 
Constitutional challenges to closed records statutes have primarily focused on three main 
arguments:  (1) the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) the penumbra of 
privacy rights that have grown out of the Bill of Rights, and (3) adoptees’ First Amendment 
fundamental right to receive information about his origins. 
First, proponents of open records statutes argue that all adults in the United States should 
have equal rights to access their birth records.  Adoptees have challenged sealed records statutes 
on the grounds that such statutes deny adoptees as a class the equal protection of the laws 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
49     
They argue that requiring adoptees to obtain a 
court order to gain access to their birth records when non-adopted persons may obtain a copy of 
their birth certificate simply upon the payment of a minimal registrar’s fee constitutes 
unconstitutional  discrimination.
50      
Additionally,  adoptees  assert  that  these  statutes  create  a 
“suspect” or “quasi-suspect” class for which there is no compelling State justification.51  They 
 
rely on Supreme Court decisions which have scrutinized legislative classifications based on race, 
national origin, sex, and illegitimacy.
52
 
The  Supreme  Court  provided  that  “suspect  classes  are  those  that  suffer  from  an 
‘immutable characteristic determined solely by accident of birth’ and have had a history of the 
relegation of the class to an inferior status.”53    Courts have unanimously held that adoptees do 
 
 
 
49 
See, e.g., Mills v. Atlantic City Dept. of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 652 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1977). 
50 
Id. 
51 
Id. at 653. 
52 
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) 
(alienage); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (national origin); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 
U.S. 762 (1977) (illegitimacy); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (sex). 
53 
Frontiero, supra note 52, at 685-87. 
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not comprise a suspect class because their status is the result of a legal proceeding, not a product 
of birth.
54    
Moreover, courts maintain that the adoption process, of which the closed records 
statutes are an integral part, often improve the situation of the children, rather than “vilify or 
relegate the adoptee to an inferior status.” 55 
Secondly, adoptees contend that the constitutional right to privacy in familial 
relationships
56 
includes a right to know the identity of birth parents.
57   
Challenges based on the 
adoptee’s  right  to  privacy  have  failed  for  two  reasons:    courts  have  either  found  that  the 
adoptee’s right to privacy does not exist58, or that it is subordinated to the privacy right of the 
birth parents.”59 
Lastly, adoptees argue that the right to know, or receive information, as protected by the 
First Amendment right to free speech, is violated by the sealed adoption statutes because they are 
not allowed access to their original birth certificates or to the identity of the birth parents.
60
 
Courts have also unanimously rejected this argument on the grounds that the “First Amendment 
 
does not guarantee a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the 
 
public generally.”61 
 
2. Public Policy Arguments 
 
 
 
 
54 
See, e.g., Mills, supra note 49, at 653. 
55 
Id. 
56 
Supreme Court cases finding rights of family privacy: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (woman's 
right to terminate her pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (matters involving 
contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (freedom to marry); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158 (1944) (matters involving child rearing); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942) (right to procreate). 
57 
See, e.g., In re Roger B., 8418 N.E.2d 751, 753 (Ill. 1981). 
58 
See id. (court held that “although information regarding one's background, heritage, and heredity is 
important to one's identity, it does not fall within any heretofore delineated zone of privacy implicitly 
protected within the Bill of Rights”). 
59 
See Mills, supra note 49, at 651-52. 
60 
See, e.g., In re Roger B, supra note 57, at 757. 
61 
Id. 
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Due to their unsuccessful constitutional challenges, proponents of open records statutes 
have focused their campaign on public policy arguments.  For instance, they argue that adoptees 
need access to their birth records to ensure their psychological and physical health.  According to 
psychologists’ reports, adoptees feel a sense of “genealogical bewilderment,” which is “a state of 
confusion and uncertainty in a child who either has no knowledge of his biological parents or 
only uncertain knowledge of them.”
62    
Courts have recognized the importance of an adoptee’s 
 
psychological need to know, which has “its origins in the psychological makeup of the adoptee’s 
identity, self-image, and perceptions of reality.”63    In Mills, the court noted that these feelings 
may “manifest themselves in physical symptoms such as nervousness or insomnia, or in a 
psychological inability of the adoptees to devote themselves fully and wholeheartedly to their 
efforts.”64 
In addition, proponents allege that when adoption records are sealed, adoptees do not 
 
have access to potentially life-saving medical information.  If an adoptee is facing a serious 
medical condition, such as organ failure or leukemia, he may quickly need to find a person who 
is genetically connected to him in order to receive a necessary donation to save his life.
65
 
Moreover, adoptees should be allowed the same opportunities that non-adopted persons have to 
 
know their family medical histories in order to prevent genetically inherited conditions.
66
 
Adoption statutes are purported to be in the “best interests of the child.”67   The problem 
noted by open records proponents is that state statutes and courts fail to address the fact that the 
 
 
 
62 
See Wendy L. Weiss, Ohio House Bill 419: Increased Openness in Adoption Records Law, 45 CLEVE. 
ST. L. REV. 101, 125 (1997). 
63 
Mills, supra note 49, at 655. 
64 
Id. 
65 
Cabellero, supra note 13, at 296. 
66 
Id. 
67 
See generally JOSEPH H. HOLLINGER, ET. AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (The Free 
Press 1973). 
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state’s role as parens patriae ends upon the adoptee reaching the age of majority.68     Open 
records proponents concede that the sealing of records at the time of relinquishment may be 
temporarily appropriate and in the best interests of the child.
69   
However, they reason that as an 
adopted child matures and the birth parents’ relinquishment recedes in time, the child’s identity 
interests should begin to outweigh the interests of the state, adoptive parents, and biological 
parents.
70   
As adults, adoptees should have the right to decide what is in their best interests, yet 
“adoption legislation forgets that what is in adoptees’ best interests as children may no longer be 
so once they have reached adulthood.”71 
 
Open records proponents argue that adoptees are the only party in the adoption process 
who did not voluntarily consent to the sealing of the birth records.
72   
Moreover, they believe that 
fairness dictates the unsealing of records because adoptees are the co-owners of that 
information.
73
 
In the early twentieth century, state legislatures originally enacted sealed records statutes 
to protect the parties from the stigmas attached to illegitimacy, unwed mothers, and infertility.
74
 
Proponents of open records purport that these stigmas are not prevalent in today’s society, and, 
 
therefore, these statutes are no longer warranted.
75    
They point to the rise in open adoptions as 
 
 
 
 
68 
See, e.g., In re Sage, 586 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (“We must keep in mind that the 
adopted child eventually becomes an adult, and one may question whether continued confidentiality 
remains in the adoptee’s best interests once he reaches majority.”). 
69 
Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 150, 172 
(1999). 
70 
Id.; see also Cabellero, supra note 13, at 301. 
71 
Jason Kuhns, The Sealed Adoption Records Controversy: Breaking Down the Walls of Secrecy, 24 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 259, 271-72 (1994). 
72 
Cabellero, supra note 13, at 296. 
73 
See Bobbi W. Y. Lum, Privacy v. Secrecy: The Open Adoption Records Movement and its Impact on 
Hawaii, 15 U. HAW. L. REV. 483, 493 (1993). 
74 
Fleming, supra note 15, at 462. 
75 
See Heidi Hildebrade, Because They Want to Know: An Examination of the Legal Rights of Adoptees 
and Their Parents, 24 S. ILL. U. L. J. 515, 536-37 (2000). 
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indicative that this type of secrecy is not justified.
76   
Moreover, proponents argue that closed 
records statutes further entrench these stigmas and perpetuate the myth that adoption is 
shameful.
77
 
Advocates of open records contend that birth parents have no reasonable expectation of 
lifelong privacy because adoption records may always be  unsealed upon a judicial finding of 
good case.
78    
In Doe v. Sundquist, the court held that “there simply has never been an absolute 
guarantee or even a reasonable expectation by the birth parent or any other party that adoption 
records were permanently sealed.”79     In fact, the court noted that a review of the history of 
Tennessee’s adoption statutes reveals just the opposite.80 
 
Further, proponents point to the statistics which reveal that a significant number of birth 
parents support open  records.
81     
Numerous birth parent organizations, including the Concerned 
United  Birthparents,  promote  adoptees’  right  to  unrestricted  access  to  their  birth  records.82 
Supporters contend that the presumption that birth parents wish to have no contact with their 
 
children is a myth.
83   
On the contrary, birth parents claim to have an enduring connection to their 
 
 
 
 
76 
Id. 
77 
See Nancy S. Ashe, Adopting.org, The Open Records Debate, http://www.adopting.org/adoptions/the- 
open-records-debate-2.html (last visited April 22, 2012). 
78 
See id. 
79 
2 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tenn. 1999). 
80 
Id. The court stated that early adoption statutes required neither that records be sealed nor that the 
parties’ identities remain confidential.  Later statutory amendments provided that even if sealed, records 
could be disclosed upon a request by an adopted person and a judicial finding that disclosure was in the 
best interests of the adoptee and the public.  Even later amendments permitted disclosure of sealed 
records under certain circumstances even without a judicial finding.  Id. 
81 
Lum, supra note 73, at 495 (nearly 90% of birth mothers surveyed supported the release of identifying 
information to adoptees). 
82 
See Cahn & Singer, supra note 69, at 179. 
83 
Brett S. Silverman, The Winds of Change in Adoption Laws: Should Adoptees Have Access to Adoption 
Records?, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 85, 92 (2001); see also Elizabeth S. Cole, The Effects of Unsealing Adoption 
Records in New Jersey, http://www.americanadoptioncongress.org/reform_materials.php (last visited on 
April 20, 2012) (noting that the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services, which contacts birth 
parents whose adopted children are searching for them, reports that 95% of birth parents desire contact). 
14  
 
 
child long after relinquishment and often desire a reunion in order to “resolve old feelings of 
guilt and erase years of questions about the fact of the relinquished child.”84 
Open records advocates also argue that open records do not threaten the role of the 
adoptive parents and that the majority of adoptive parents support adult adoptees having the 
ability to access to their original birth certificates.
85   
Most adoptive parents have a healthy, stable 
relationship with their adopted child and, thus, are open to the adoptee’s desire to investigate his 
birth parents.
86
 
B. Arguments Against Open Records Statutes 
 
Open records statutes violate numerous constitutionally protected rights, including the 
familial right of privacy, the right of confidentiality, and the right of reproductive autonomy. 
In  Griswold  v.  Connecticut,
87   
the  Supreme  Court  first  recognized  a  constitutionally 
 
protected zone of privacy created within the “penumbra” of the Bill of Rights.  The Court has 
found that the right to privacy includes the right to make certain personal decisions regarding 
marriage, procreation, contraception, child-rearing, and family relationships.
88     
In Stanley v. 
Georgia,
89 
the Court stated that the drafters of the Constitution conferred as against government 
 
 
 
 
84 
Kuhns, supra note 71, at 277. 
85 
Cahn & Singer, supra note 69, at 187 (84% of adoptive mothers and 73% of adoptive fathers surveyed 
supported). 
86 
Silverman, supra note 83, at 96. 
87 
381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (right of marital privacy invoked to void a statute prohibiting the use of 
contraception). 
88 
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895-98 (1992) (striking down a state’s spousal 
notice requirement as an undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra note 
56, at 453 (upholding the right of unmarried persons to use contraceptives, “the right of privacy…is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters 
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child”). 
 
Legal Information Institute, Right of Privacy: Personal Autonomy, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/Personal_ Autonomy (last visited April 22, 2012). 
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394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
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“the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
 
civilized men.” 
 
The vast majority of courts have held that sealed records statutes protect the biological 
parents’ “right to privacy, a right to be let alone.”90    Upon the relinquishment of the child for 
adoption, the biological parents receive an actual statutory assurance that their identity will 
remain confidential.
91   
Relying upon this assurance, the biological parent of an adult adoptee has 
established new life relationship and perhaps a new family unit.
92   
It is highly likely that she has 
chosen not to disclose to “her spouse, children, or other relations, friends, or associates the facts 
of an emotionally upsetting and potentially socially unacceptable occurrence 18 or more years 
ago.”93   The adult adoptee’s “preverbal knock on the door” may be a source of great pleasure to 
the biological parent.
94   
However, in other cases, it may be a “destructive intrusion into the life 
that  the  [biological]  parent  has  built  since  the  adoption.”95      This  sudden  emergence  may 
contribute to family disharmony, domestic violence, and possibly divorce.
96   
Moreover, it makes 
the biological parent susceptible to blackmail threats to disclose embarrassing circumstances 
surrounding the birth.
97
 
Respecting a birth parent's desire for separation and confidentiality is also consistent with 
 
the  broad  deference  accorded  to  parental  decision-making  on  behalf  of  children  in  other 
 
90 
E.g., Mills, supra note 49, at 651; but see Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tenn. 1999) (holding 
that a state statute allowing disclosure of sealed adoptions records to adult adoptees does not violate 
biological parents’ rights to familial privacy because the statute permits biological parents to register a 
“contact veto”). 
91 
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92 
Id. 
93 
Id. 
94 
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Id. 
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Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-78 (1992) (striking down a state’s spousal notice 
requirement before a woman can obtain an adoption as an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to abortion 
and as an intrusion on a woman’s right to privacy in general because the notice may cause domestic 
violence). 
97 
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contexts.
98 
In addition, respecting the decision not to maintain a parent-child relationship is 
consistent with the protection afforded to other reproductive choices.
99
 
Additionally, the adoptive parents, who have taken into their home a child whom they 
will regard as their own, have a right to privacy and an interest in placing the original birth 
records under seal.
100    
They must be permitted to “raise this child without fear of interference 
from the natural parents and without fear that the birth status of an illegitimate child will be 
revealed or used as a means of harming the child or themselves.”101 
Secondly, open records statutes violate the biological parents’ right to confidentiality.  In 
Whalen v. Roe,
102  
the Supreme Court defined the right to confidentiality as “the individual 
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”  Courts have held that information regarding 
one’s “intimate relationships”103 or sexual activities104 is protected from disclosure.  Courts have 
also recognized the need to preserve the legitimate privacy claims of persons affected by the 
disclosure  of  confidential  information  sought  under  the  Freedom  of  Information  Act.
105
 
Accordingly, the unsealing of adoption records violates a biological parent’s zone of privacy as it 
 
exposes her past sexual activities and potentially the fact that she was an unwed mother.
106
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Finally, open records statutes violate women’s right to reproductive choice and the right 
to terminate the parent-child relationship.  In Margaret S. v. Edwards,
107 
the court noted that the 
freedom over reproductive autonomy includes the entire decisional range, both the decision to 
bear children,
108  
as well as the decision not to bear children.
109    
Accordingly, a birth parent’s 
right to terminate the relationship with her child by placing the child for adoption should be 
afforded the same anonymity, confidentiality, and privacy that is given in the context of the right 
to abortion.  When faced with an unwanted or unplanned pregnancy, many women struggle with 
the decision to abort or to place the child for adoption.  Woman who fear public disclosure of 
their unwanted pregnancies may be more likely to choose abortion, as it affords for lifelong 
anonymity.
110   
Thus, eliminating the guarantee of confidentiality in the adoption process limits a 
woman’s reproductive autonomy. 
V. Alternative to Open Records Statutes 
 
There are better ways to balance the birth parents’ privacy interests against the adoptees’ 
desire for information other than the going to the extreme of unsealing adoption records.  The 
optimum balance can be achieved by requiring birth parents to disclose medical and ethic 
information and undergo genetic testing and establishing, promoting mutual consent registries, 
and protecting open adoptions and post-termination contact agreements. 
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488 F. Supp. 181, 190 (E.D. La. 1980). 
108 
See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640 (1974) (striking down regulations that 
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(1942) (striking down court-ordered sterilization as violative of right to procreate, which is “fundamental 
to the very existence and survival of the race”). 
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See, Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Roe v. Wade, supra note 56, at 13; 
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See Massey v. Parker, 362 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (Schott, J., dissenting) (“a cavalier 
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A. Medical Information and Genetic Testing 
 
Most states have statutes dictating precisely what information must be disclosed to the 
adopted parents at the time of adoption.  Although the specific requirements vary by state, 
biological parents are often required to disclose some or all of the following information: the 
circumstances under which the child came to be placed for adoption; a medical history of the 
biological mother and, if known, the biological father; a medical history of the adoptee, if such 
history exists; information regarding the age, nationality, race, ethnic background, and religious 
preferences of the biological parents; the educational level of the biological parents; a physical 
description of the biological parents; and the existence of other children born to the biological 
parents.
111    
While the biological parents are required to disclose this information at the time of 
 
the adoption, not all states mandate the release of this information to adoptees upon reaching the 
age of majority.
112    
However, the adoptees’ interest in their medical and genetic background 
supersedes the birth parents’ privacy interests in this own non-identifying medical information. 
Therefore, the states must require its disclosure. 
Unfortunately, information collected at the time of the child's adoption may be of limited 
value.
113    
Parents who surrender children for adoption are often young, and many diseases will 
not be manifested at that time.  Thus, requiring information about other family members, such as 
grandparents and other extended relatives, will provide further clues.  Nevertheless, the potential 
benefits to the child of possessing this genetic information is further limited by the lack of a 
mechanism for updating this health information.  Currently, Texas is the only state that mandates 
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updating health information, although no penalties are imposed by the statute for failing to 
supplement the record.
114
 
Currently, no statutes require the biological parents to undergo genetic testing during the 
adoption  process.
115      
However,  doing  so  would  greatly  benefit  the  adoptee,  birth  parents, 
adoptive parents, and the state.  Adoptees should be aware of their genetic makeup and their 
families’ because depending on the way a particular genetic condition is inherited, an individual 
could be a carrier of the genetic mutation that causes a particular condition, even if the person is 
unaffected.
116   
Adoptees would benefit from this testing requirement by being able to prepare for 
and prevent potential conditions to which they may be genetically predisposed.  In addition, 
providing birth parents’ genetic test results to adoptees gives them a more complete picture of 
their genetic makeup than merely the results of their own genetic test. 
By undergoing genetic testing, birth parents gain more insight into their own genetic 
information and predispositions.
117    
It may reassure biological parents that their children are as 
well-equipped as possible to prevent and treat future genetic-based conditions.  Moreover, giving 
this genetic information to adoptees may protect the birth parents’ privacy by reducing the 
court’s willingness to unseal the adoption records.118   Courts may no longer find “good cause” to 
unseal  records  so  that  adoptees  may  obtain  their  biological  parents’  genetic  and  medical 
information. 
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Adoptive parents are automatically have less information about their adopted child than if 
they had biologically conceived the child.  Mandating genetic for birth parents helps to alleviate 
this disadvantage by providing adoptive parents with more information about the adoptee’s 
background, which further equips them to raise and care for the child.
119    
Supplying this 
information to adoptive parents further solidifies the new family and mimics the normal birth 
parent-child relationship as children naturally question their parents about their heritage, and 
parents disseminate this information.
120   
It also enables the adoptive parents to better prepare for 
and prevent the child’s future genetic conditions.  In turn, medical expenses are lessened because 
adoptive parents can focus on prevention, rather than treatment.
121
 
States would reap the rewards of a genetic testing requirement in numerous ways. It 
 
would lower overall health care costs as it is less costly to prevent a genetically-predisposed 
condition  than  to  treat  it  once  it  manifests.
122      
Additionally,  judicial  resources  would  be 
conserved  as fewer adoptees would petition the courts to unseal their adoption records for 
medical reasons.
123
 
Ultimately, a requirement that biological parents undergo genetic counseling during the 
adoption process would be advantageous to all parties involved.  All parties benefit by being able 
to focus on preventing the manifestation genetic conditions.   Adoptees benefit by obtaining a 
more  complete  overview  of  their  background  and  history.    Biological  parents’  privacy  is 
protected by reducing the likelihood that a court would unseal the adoption records and disclose 
their identifying information.   Finally, the state benefits by reducing its health care costs and 
conserving its judicial resources. 
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B. Mutual Consent Registries 
 
There are two types of adoption registries that facilitate the acquisition of identifying 
information:   (1)   passive, voluntary mutual consent registries and (2) active, confidential 
intermediary system.
124   
Passive mutual consent registries, which are coordinated by the state or 
outsourced to an agency, require adoptees and birth parents to seek out the registry and provide 
their names and contact information in order to participate.  If both parties have provided their 
identifying information and consent to its release, then each party is notified and given the 
information. 
Another system which may be employed to manage birth records is an active consent 
registry.  If either the birth parents or adoptee desires to locate the other, then a confidential 
intermediately is appointed to locate the “missing” party.125   Once the “missing” party is found, 
the intermediary informs him that the other party requested release of her identifying information 
and that she may choose whether or not to do so.
126     
Then, her response is relayed by the 
intermediary to the party that initiated the search.
127    
A biological parent’s refusal to consent 
 
effectively ends the process, preventing the adoptee from access to any information. 
 
Passive mutual consent registries are the preferable option as they better protect the 
biological parents’ expectation of privacy.   However minimal it may be, the confidential 
intermediary is still intruding into the biological parent’s “new “ life.  These registries have been 
criticized as being ineffective because most people do not know of their existence or how to 
register and use them.
128 
Therefore, it is imperative that states not only counsel biological 
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parents about the registry and their options, but also run a public information campaign to create 
 
and raise awareness of the registry’s existence. 
 
Moreover, current mutual consent registries operate only at the individual state level.
129
 
 
In today’s transient society, this system could hinder the reunification of parties that have moved 
from the state where the adoption occurred.  Thus, it is crucial that Congress create a national 
mutual consent registry or the states must promote the interstate cross-referencing of registries. 
C. Open Adoptions 
 
In open adoptions, the biological and adoptive parents agree to maintain an ongoing 
relationship after the parties relinquish their parental rights.
130   
The parties decide on the degree 
of contact between the biological parents and the adoptee, which can range from sporadic letters 
or telephone calls to regular visits.
131   
Supporters of open adoptions contend that open adoptions 
benefit all members of the adoption triangle.
132    
Open adoption may ease the pain and anguish 
that biological parents experience in giving a child up for adoption.     The biological parents 
retain some ties to their child, thus “alleviating the fears the birth [parent] has about the adoptive 
placement.”133     Any form  of contact or communication, from pictures to visits, will likely 
provide the birth mother with comfort, knowing the child was placed in a loving family. 
134
 
Some adoptive parents fear that the biological parent may come to regret her decision to 
place her child for adoption and come back to “reclaim” the child.135    However, allowing the 
biological parent to be a part of the child's life, and see how happy the child is with the adoptive 
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parents, may alleviate these fears.
136    
If the biological parent does later come to regret her 
decision, there is often little recourse in the courts.
137    
The adoptive parents’ failure to comply 
with any post-termination agreement for visitation or communication would not provide a 
biological parent with grounds to revoke her consent or the adoption.
138   
However, the adoptive 
parents’  fear that the biological parents  will return and interfere with  their familial unit is 
eliminated because the adoptive parents are aware of the biological parents’ involvement and can 
monitor it.
139    
Moreover, any relationship with the biological parents will likely facilitate the 
adoptive parents in explaining adoption to the child.
140
 
Lastly, open adoptions benefit the adoptees by allowing them ability to communicate 
with the biological parents allows immediate and constant access to any information about which 
they may be curious.
141   
Open adoption provides children with opportunities to learn about who 
they are, without guilt or concern that such communication is a betrayal to their adoptive 
family.
142   
Ideally, the child will come to realize that both his biological parents and relatives and 
his adoptive parents love them, and in turn providing an extended support network on which the 
child may rely.
143
 
Some states have embraced open adoptions by permitting courts to grant limited post- 
termination contact within the final adoption decree.
144   
For instance, Section 161.2061(a) of the 
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Texas Family Code permits a court to order limited post-termination contact between an adoptee 
and a biological parent who has voluntarily relinquished her parental rights.
145   
If the court finds 
that limited post-termination contact would be in the best interest of the child, the court may 
include provisions in the termination decree allowing the biological parent to receive information 
about the child, provide written communication to the child, and have limited access to the 
child.
146
 
VI.      Conclusion 
 
Not only does confidentiality in the adoption process protect the biological parents’ 
fundamental right of privacy, but it promotes the state’s interest in ensuring the integrity of the 
adoption process.   When biological mothers opt for adoption rather than abortion, which 
guarantees lifelong anonymity, they must be able to rely on the statutory promise of 
confidentiality.    In reliance of this promise, the biological parent of an adult adoptee has 
established new life relationship and perhaps a new family unit and may have chosen not to 
disclose her past unwanted pregnancy and decision to place the child for adoption.  Her right to 
familial privacy must be protected from the preverbal “knock on the door” by the adult adoptee. 
Adoption represents a new beginning for the adoptee, adoptive parents, and biological 
parents.  Confidentiality in adoption records permits biological parents to move beyond a painful 
chapter in their lives in favor of a fresh start.  It also enables the newly formed adoptive family to 
develop strong, loving relationships without the stigma of illegitimacy on the child.   While 
confidentiality may unfortunately serve as a barrier to a happy reunion between adoptees and 
their biological parents, it serves a vital function of ensuring the parties new chapters in life that 
will not be disrupted without a proper demonstration of “good cause.” 
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The   proper   balance   between   confidentiality   and   openness   can   be   achieved   by 
mechanisms other than the dramatic, unwarranted step of opening adoption records.  Adoptees 
should be given as much information about their origins and backgrounds as possible, short of 
any information that would identify their biological parents.  Requiring birth parents to disclose 
family medical histories and ethnic information and undergo genetic testing and establishing and 
promoting mutual consent registries gives significant opportunities to adoptees while continuing 
to protect the identity of biological parents. 
Today, doctors are more adept at combating and predicting diseases and disorders due in 
part to the advent of genetic testing and expanding knowledge about hereditary diseases and 
medical predispositions.  The genetic testing requirement would afford adoptees an opportunity 
to take advantage of these medical advancements, placing them in virtually the same position as 
non-adopted persons.   However, biological parents’ privacy is protected by maintaining the 
confidentiality of their identifying information.  All parties involved, including the state, benefits 
from the decrease in medical expenses may focusing on preventing diseases, as opposed to 
treating them after manifestation. 
The voluntary consent adoption registries create a mechanism for the disclosure of 
identifying information only where there is a mutual desire for that information to be revealed. 
Therefore, the biological parents’ privacy is more adequately protected. 
Finally, open adoptions and agreements regarding post-termination contact between the 
biological parent and the adoptee gives the parties the autonomy to decide what is in their best 
interests.  Obviously, biological parents who desire confidentiality would not opt for such an 
arrangement.  But it affords biological parents the opportunity to have some level of continuing 
contact with the child that they have placed for adoption, while simultaneously permitting the 
26  
 
 
child to know the identity of his biological parents without having to overcome the significant 
good  cause  hurdle  and  allowing  the  child  to  seek  answers  to  any questions  he  may have 
regarding his origins, medical history, and the circumstances of his adoption. 
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